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Abstract  
National dialogues aim to reconstruct a legitimate institutional framework after a 
conflict through broader representativeness as well as a new social contract between 
the state and the society. The European Union (EU) can play various roles in such 
processes. However, the involvement of an external actor may undermine the 
national ownership and credibility of national dialogues. Hence, the first aim of this 
paper is to analyse how the EU can support national dialogues without undermining 
their national ownership and legitimacy. To answer that question, this paper develops 
a new analytical grid conceptualising the various roles that the EU can play in national 
dialogues. This analytical grid, the Analysis of National Dialogues External Support 
model – or ANDES model - shows that the EU has various entry points to support 
national dialogues and that those vary from one national dialogue to the other. It is 
then only through lessons learned that the EU may find the right balance between 
pushing for liberal reforms and respecting the national ownership of the national 
dialogue. In order to illustrate the ANDES model by a concrete example, the Yemeni 
National Dialogue Conference (NDC) is analysed. While the Yemeni NDC was 
considered at the beginning as highly promising, this paper’s second objective is to 
analyse why this national dialogue failed. The paper finds that various elements in the 
process-design, the decision-making management and the operationalisation of the 
Yemeni national dialogue were not appropriate for the country’s situation, reflecting 
a general lack of social cohesion of the Yemeni society during the national dialogue 
and undermining the success of the process.  
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Introduction: the EU’s role(s) in post-conflict national dialogues abroad  
The Arab Spring has revealed deep divisions among Middle Eastern and North African 
(MENA) societies that were previously hidden behind authoritarian regimes. As the 
polarisation between secular and liberal political forces, military, Islamist, Sunni and 
Shia communities led to the return of violence in the region, mediation appeared as 
the only way to resolve these conflicts.1 In order for these societies “to make a clean 
break with the past and move forward toward forging a new social contract”,2 a new 
narrative of social inclusion and civil participation in state affairs has been encouraged 
by various stakeholders such as political leaders and civil society organisations. Among 
various confidence-building measures and inclusive dialogue processes, national 
dialogues emerged in various MENA countries, including Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain and Yemen.3 National dialogues are defined 
by Barnes as “nationally owned political processes aimed at generating consensus 
among a broad range of national stakeholders in times of deep political crisis, in post-
war situations or during far-reaching political transitions”.4 In that sense, national 
dialogues aim to reconstruct a legitimate institutional framework through broader 
representativeness, as well as a new social contract between the state and society.5 
As the legitimacy of national dialogues is based on social inclusivity and national 
ownership, the involvement of an external actor such as the European Union (EU), 
promoting its own interests and principles, is delicate and could undermine the whole 
process.6 National dialogues, like all peace processes, are indeed unlikely to have a 
positive impact if they seem “illegitimate, imposed or going against the grain of 
locality”.7 In order to engage in national dialogues, the EU must therefore be seen as 
                                                 
1 J. Bisard, “The EU’s Mediation Role in the post-Arab Spring Era: A Comparative Analysis of 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya”, POMEAS Policy Brief, no. 9, Istanbul, Project on the Middle East and 
the Arab Springs, 2015, p. 1.  
2 I. Fraihat, Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya and Tunisia after the Arab Spring¸ New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 2016, p. 7.  
3 Berghof Foundation, National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners, Berlin, Berghof 
Foundation, 2017, p. 19. 
4 C. Barnes, “Dilemmas of Ownership, Inclusivity, Legitimacy and Power: Towards Transformative 
National Dialogue Processes”, National Dialogue Handbook Background Paper, no. 1, Berlin, 
Berghof Foundation, 2017, p. 7.  
5 T. Paffenholz, A. Zachariassenn & C. Helfer, “What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?”, 
Report Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, Geneva, Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies, 2017, p. 22. 
6 J. Harlander, “Supporting a National Dialogue : Dilemmas & Options for Third Parties”, 
Mediation Practice Series, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 2016, p. 6.  
7 A. Ramsbotham & A. Wennmann, “Legitimacy and Peace Processes: From Coercion to 
Consent”, Accord, no. 25, London, Conciliation Resources, 2014, p. 15.  
Esther Kestemont 
5 
a legitimate actor by the various stakeholders and the national population. Defined 
by Suchman as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions”,8 the legitimacy of an external actor in mediation and 
dialogue facilitation is closely linked to its impartiality in the conflict.9 An impartial 
external actor treats the various stakeholders fairly and should not have any material 
interests in the negotiations. However, being impartial does not mean being neutral, 
as external actors may promote universal principles and values vis-à-vis the parties.10 
Youngs stresses that external actors must keep in mind that “targeted reform efforts 
[…] are needed to make mediation work”, by ensuring that all actors can effectively 
and fairly participate in the peace-building process.11 Thus, “it is in this relationship 
between mediation and reform aims that a new framework for assessing external 
actors’ role in today’s divided Middle East is most required”.12 
Hence, the first objective of this paper is to analyse how the EU can support national 
dialogues abroad without undermining the national ownership of such processes. To 
answer that question, this paper puts forward a new analytical grid analysing the roles 
that an external actor such as the EU can play to support national dialogues. This new 
analytical grid, the Analysis of National Dialogues External Support model – or ANDES 
model – combines the roles that external actors can play in national dialogues, 
conceptualised in the National Dialogues Handbook of the Berghof Foundation,13 and 
four general factors to analyse national dialogues in general. These four factors are 
inspired by the ‘Change Burger’ model designed by the psychologists Leroy and 
Schiffers for companies in managerial transition:14 (1) the process-design of the 
national dialogue, (2) its decision-management, (3) its operationalisation, and (4) the 
social cohesion of post-conflict societies going through national dialogues. The ANDES 
model shows that the EU has various entry points to support each of these factors, such 
                                                 
8 M.C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches”, Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 20, no. 3, 1995, p. 573. 
9 United Nations, “Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 
Conflict Prevention and Resolution”, Report of the Secretary-General A/66/811, New York, 
United Nations, 2012, p. 25, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ 
SGReport_StrenghteningtheRoleofMediation_A66811.pdf  
10 Ibid.  
11 R. Youngs, From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed, Brussels, Carnegie 
Europe, 2014, p. 15.  
12 Ibid., p. 18.  
13 Berghof Foundation, op.cit., p. 161.  
14 J.F. Leroy & C. Schiffers, Aperçu général du Change Burger, Liège, Pragmagora, unpublished.  
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as being a funder, an enabler, an observer, a facilitator, a provider of technical 
support and expertise, and an actor in the implementation of the process. However, 
these entry points vary from one national dialogue to another. It is then through the 
analysis of various national dialogues that the EU may learn some lessons for finding 
the right balance in its activities between pushing for liberal reforms and respecting 
the national ownership of the national dialogue.   
In order to illustrate the ANDES model with a concrete example, the Yemeni National 
Dialogue Conference (NDC) is analysed in this paper. This process was initially 
designed as one of the most inclusive and democratic peace process in the Middle 
East. Yet, Yemen is today highly divided and violent hostilities continue between the 
parties on the ground, creating one of the biggest humanitarian crises worldwide.15 As 
Yemen’s national dialogue was initially highly promising, the second aim of this paper 
is to analyse why the Yemeni National Dialogue ‘failed’. The paper finds that various 
elements in the process-design, the decisions procedures and the operationalisation 
of the Yemeni national dialogue were not appropriate for the Yemeni situation, 
reflecting a general lack of social cohesion of the Yemeni society during the national 
dialogue, which undermined the success of the process.  
The paper is divided in two parts. The first part is dedicated to explaining and applying 
the four factors of the ANDES model to the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference. 
The second part focuses on the various roles that an external actor such as the EU may 
play in national dialogues, and what the entry points of the EU to support the Yemeni 
National Dialogue Conference were. The paper concludes with some lessons learned 
from the Yemeni case for the European Union’s action in future national dialogues.  
 
The Yemeni National Dialogue Conference: the road to a failure? 
The context of the conflict in Yemen 
As in most of the countries where the Arab Spring took place, Yemeni uprisings were 
driven by long-standing frustration over the economic situation as a whole, the rate of 
unemployment, the corruption, the lack of services provided by the state in areas such 
as education, health, physical security (increase in transnational terrorist groups), food 
security, water and energy resources. Moreover, Yemen is characterised by ethnic 
                                                 
15 European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 
“Yemen”, 27 June 2018, retrieved 17 October 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/ 
middle-east/yemen_fr. 
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and regional tensions as well as power rivalries. The People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, alias South Yemen, was independent from 1967 to its unification with the 
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), in 1990. After an unachieved democratic 
transition, the civil war of 1994 ended with the North taking the city of Aden, the centre 
of South Yemen, and the escape of South Yemen’s former president Ali Salim al-Beidh. 
The victory of the North engendered two types of narratives. On the one hand, the first 
narrative promotes the end of the separation in order to deepen Yemen’s unity. The 
second narrative, on the other hand, highlights the robbing of the southern resources 
and the general violence perpetrated by President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime which 
in 2011 had been in power for 33 years.16 In addition to the North-South tensions, the 
marginalisation and the repression of the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia group in the north of 
the country, reflected an ethnic fracture in Yemen. Furthermore, the central political 
system was on the verge of a break down after three decades of corruption and 
political rivalries which led some political entities and tribal actors to join the protests.17  
Confronted with thousands of people in the streets at the end of January 2011 and 
the fragmentation of his traditional political elite and the military forces, President 
Saleh asked the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for mediation.18 With the permanent 
members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the EU, the GCC formed the 
‘Group of Ten’ (G10). The GCC Initiative, based on a plan tabled by the US and the 
EU, was on 23 April 2011 submitted to President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The latter signed 
the GCC’s Implementing Mechanism six months after its submission, on 23 November 
2011. The GCC Initiative presented a two-year democratic ‘Transition Roadmap’, 
divided into two phases. The first phase included Saleh’s delegation of presidential 
powers to his Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, the cessation of the hostilities 
and the formation of a transitional government of national unity. This government 
comprised Saleh’s former party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and the 
opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).19 The second phase comprised the setting up 
of a National Dialogue Conference, in order to work on a broad agreement for a new 
constitution, which would be the basis for the Constitutional Drafting Commission. This 
new Constitution was then supposed to be submitted to a referendum, before the 
                                                 
16 N. C. Girke, “A Matter of Balance: the European Union as a Mediator in Yemen”, European 
Security, vol. 24, no. 4, 2015, p. 515.  
17 E. Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue”, Special Report, no. 342, 
United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2014, p. 2.  
18 Girke, op.cit., p. 515.  
19 Ibid., p. 514.  
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organisation of parliamentary elections, finalising the transition process.20 Yemen’s 
National Dialogue Conference started in March 2013 and was concluded in January 
2014. This almost one-year long dialogue had held significant promise and was 
described in ‘The UN Constitutional’ newsletter as an “historic milestone in Yemen’s 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy”.21  
However, by the time the Constitutional Drafting Commission was about to start its 
work, the political landscape in Yemen changed significantly and the outcomes of 
the national dialogue became impossible to implement. The regional and ethnic 
fragmentation led to a total breakdown and triggered a new civil war. In August 2014, 
the Houthi started an offensive and gained almost complete control of Sana’a and 
other cities. The Houthis formed the Supreme Revolution Committee and adopted a 
Constitutional Decree to govern the country, put the members of government under 
house arrest, and forced President Hadi to resign.22 Finally, President Hadi escaped 
and fled to Aden, where he withdrew his resignation and branded the Houthis’s 
actions as an illegal coup.  
In response to the Houthis’ advancement, Saudi Arabia launched a massive offensive 
operation – ‘Decisive Storm’ – in March 2015 in order to replace Hadi’s government in 
Sana’a.23 In April 2015, this operation was renamed ‘Renewal of Hope’, and replaced 
by a coalition including the GCC members and other Sunni countries such as Jordan 
or Morocco.24 The return of the hostilities has led to the largest humanitarian crisis 
worldwide, with 80% of the Yemeni population being in need of assistance and 
protection.25 It is therefore important to analyse why the Yemen’s National Dialogue 
Conference failed and resulted in the current situation.    
The Yemeni National Dialogue Conference: analysis of a long-term mechanism  
Inspired by the ‘Change Burger’ managerial transition model for companies 
developed by psychologists Jean-François Leroy and Christophe Schiffers, this part of 
the paper introduces the four factors of the ANDES mode analysing national dialogues 
                                                 
20 Gaston, op.cit., p. 3.  
21 J. Gluck, “Constitution-building in a Political Vacuum: Libya and Yemen in 2014”, in M. Allen 
et al., Annual Review of Constitution-Building Processes: 2014, Stockholm, International IDEA, 
2015, p. 46.  
22 H. Hamidi, “A Comparative Analysis of the Post-Arab Spring National Dialogues in Tunisia and 
Yemen”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 15, no. 3, 2015, p. 17.  
23 Fraihat, op.cit., p. 40.  
24 Ibid., p. 50.  
25 European Commission, op.cit. 
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in general:26 the process-design, the decision-making management, the 
operationalisation, and the social cohesion of the post-conflict society going through 
a national dialogue. According to the type and the function of the national dialogue, 
the importance of the four factors will vary. 
The Yemeni National Dialogue Conference is considered as a long-term mechanism 
that aimed to deeply redefine “state-society relations or establish a new ‘social’ 
contract”.27 Long-term mechanisms contrast with short-term mechanisms that aim to 
(re-)establish a minimal political consensus in order to prevent or resolve violent crises. 
This was for example the case in Tunisia, where a limited national dialogue was set up 
to finalise the democratic transition in a period of crisis and high tensions between the 
secularists and the religious political forces in Tunisia.28 The aim of the Tunisian national 
dialogue was therefore to resolve a specific crisis, and not to redefine a new social 
contract and the whole organisation of the state such as in Yemen. The goals and 
characteristics of short-term and long-term national dialogue are therefore different, 
and will vary in the process-design, the decision-management, the operationalisation, 
and the social cohesion needed for the national dialogue to succeed.  
Process-design 
The process-design of the national dialogue refers to the planning of the process. It 
includes the mandate of the national dialogue, the setting of the agenda, the choice 
of the convener or the chair of the dialogue, the size of the participation and the 
selection criteria for the participants.  
In Yemen, a 25-member Technical Committee was established by Presidential Decree 
in July 2012 to design all aspects of the NDC. The Technical Committee was composed 
of representatives coming from political parties which had signed the Implementation 
Mechanism, as well as the other constituencies listed in the Implementation 
Mechanism, including the Houthi Movement, youth civil society and women. However, 
the Technical Committee was boycotted by the Southern Movement, although some 
individuals linked to it accepted the invitation to join the Committee.29 
                                                 
26 Leroy & Schiffers, op.cit.  
27 Berghof Foundation, op.cit., p. 22. 
28 C. Thornton, “The Rocky Path from Elections to a New Constitution in Tunisia: Mechanisms for 
Consensus-building and Inclusive Decision-making”, Oslo Forum Background Paper, Geneva, 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2016, p. 10.  
29 K. Papagianni, “National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions”, Discussion Paper, no. 3, 
Brussels, Civil Society Dialogue Network, 2014, p. 6.  
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First, the mandate reflects the general aim of the national dialogue. The mandate can 
contain various objectives such as the reaching of a cease-fire, trust-building 
measures, political reforms and democratic transition or constitution-making goals.30 
As the basis of the future discussions, the mandate has to be negotiated in transparent 
and inclusive ways. It is also important to agree on it with a large-consensus approach 
in order to foster the commitment of all the parties involved in the national dialogue.31  
The Yemeni NDC mandate had as general aim to work on a broad agreement for a 
new constitution. Several issues had to be discussed, and the NDC was divided into 
nine working groups: (1) the status of South Yemen, (2) Saada instability and the 
Houthis, (3) transitional justice, (4) state-building, (5) good governance, (6) military and 
security, (7) special entities, (8) right and freedoms, and (9) economic reforms and 
development.32 This high number of issues tackled in the Yemeni NDC raised a lot of 
expectations and made it difficult to assess and fund all of them simultaneously. 
Therefore, the energy dedicated to the NDC came at the expense of other transitional 
mechanisms such as institutional reforms.  
Second, the setting of the agenda is crucial as it is the moment when the stakeholders 
decide on the sequencing of the topics discussed during the national dialogue. The 
general timing, sequencing and duration of the national dialogue will therefore vary 
from one mandate to another, as well as from one context to another. Inclusiveness 
and transparency have to be considered as guiding principles during the agenda-
setting, as it can constitute a turning point in trust-building and understanding between 
the parties. According to Zahar, “the time-frame is always problematic”.33 In Yemen, 
The agenda-setting phase was too short given the number of issues to deal with. 
Starting in March 2013, the NDC was supposed to last six months but was finally 
extended to four additional months until January 2014.34 It was indeed necessary to 
assure the negotiation of core issues such as the regional organisation of the Yemeni 
state and “to work through the complex political and structural conflicts inherent in 
transition”.35  As the political elites were more focused on the National Dialogue 
Conference than on ensuring public services and basic needs across the country 
                                                 
30 Paffenholz, Zachariassenn & Helfer, op.cit., p. 29.  
31 Papagianni, op.cit., p. 2.  
32 C. Schmitz, “Yemen’s national dialogue”, MEI Policy Paper, Washington, DC, Middle East 
Institute, 2014, p. 6.  
33 Interview with M.-J. Zahar, Professor at Université de Montréal, via telephone, 17 April 2018.  
34 Girke, op.cit., p. 519.  
35 Gaston, op.cit., p. 12.  
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(particularly in the South), “the longer the NDC continued, the more divorced it 
appeared from this reality”.36 The time-frame happened to be a crucial element 
participating on the rise of disillusions of the population, losing interest in a process 
increasingly seen dealing with elites and external powers concerns.  
Third, the choice of a convener, as a central figure chairing the whole process, is a 
sensitive issue as the legitimacy of the process depends also on his/her acceptance 
by the population. The convener can be an individual or a group of people, an 
international or regional organisation – or several of them. The legitimacy of the 
conveners will highly depend on the process of their appointment, their 
independence, their multi-partiality, credibility and their political power vis-à-vis the 
parties.37 The NDC was chaired by the interim President Hadi himself, with eight 
additional representatives of the various actors participating in the NDC. Besides 
regional actors, the UN has taken the role of first sponsor for the NDC. Jamal Benomar, 
UN special adviser to Yemen, was the main UN mediator in the negotiations during the 
NDC until 2015.  
Fourth, the size of participation depends on the general context of the national 
dialogue, its aims, the issues at stake and the resources available. It has to be 
balanced between the desires of inclusivity and efficiency. A large participation 
would indeed increase the inclusivity and therefore the legitimacy of a national 
dialogue, yet at the risk of a decrease in efficiency and proper representation.38 With 
595 delegates, the Yemeni national dialogue was perceived at the beginning as the 
most inclusive and democratic process the region had ever seen, including a large 
number of youth, women and civil society representatives as well as the various 
regional actors, on an equal level as the traditional political parties and tribal leaders.39 
However, the large number of participants was detrimental to the efficiency of some 
issues.40 According to Gaston, “smaller groups of the right political actors – those who 
actually had traction within their parties or constituencies to be able to negotiate and 
enforce political compromises – were needed to work through many of the issues”.41  
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 9.  
37 S. Stigant & E. Murray, “National Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict Transformation?”, Peace Brief, 
Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2015. 
38 Berghof Foundation, op.cit., p. 81.  
39 Hamidi, op.cit, p. 18.  
40 Gluck, op.cit., p. 50. 
41 Gaston, op.cit., 2014, p. 10.  
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Fifth, the selection of the participants is vital because, like the size of participation, it 
increases the inclusivity, legitimacy and thus the efficiency of the process.42 The 
selection criteria consist in defining which kind of groups, stakeholders and actors are 
going to participate in the discussions. The selection procedure is about the actual 
individual selection of the participants, either by election, application, nomination or 
appointment. The panel of participants also has to be balanced with regard to other 
criteria like regional affiliation, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, or the symmetry 
of power between the parties.43 In Yemen, the selection of the participants was a 
combination of a self-selection and an appointment approach by the Technical 
Committee. While the various conflicting parties selected their own representatives, 
the working groups were composed by 30% of women, 20% of youth and 20% of civil 
society organisations appointed by two sub-committees of the Technical Committee, 
one for the South and one for the North.44 It had also been agreed that 50% percent 
of the representatives would be from the Southern part of Yemen. However, the 
representatives of the Southern region did not form a homogenous group, and some 
leaders of the al-Hiraak party were not willing to participate in the National Dialogue 
Conference. Thanks to the insistence of the international community and other 
national stakeholders, some southern representatives finally participated. 
Nevertheless, they lacked the legitimacy to defend and implement the agreement in 
their part of the country, which finally led to the rejection of the agreement as a 
whole.45  
Decision-making management 
The decision-making management focuses on the general rules that will conduct the 
national dialogue discussions. It includes the decision-making and the consensus 
modalities. This factor is highly important as it will determine the credibility and 
legitimacy of the national dialogue.  
First of all, the decision-making procedures have to be determined in order to ensure 
a democratic mode of decision-making, the legitimacy of the process and the parties’ 
strong commitment during the discussions and the implementation. It is important that 
the decision-making procedures and general rules of the national dialogue are the 
result of a pre-negotiation process either in sub-committees or in plenary session. 
                                                 
42 Paffenholz, Zachariassenn & Helfer, op.cit., p. 37.  
43 Papagianni, op.cit., p. 7.  
44 Schmitz, op.cit., p. 6.  
45 Ibid., p. 9.  
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Moreover, the ratification procedure constitutes a crucial element for the legitimacy 
of the national dialogue, as it finalises the outcomes of the process before the 
implementation phase begins. It is therefore crucial to establish how the agreement 
resulting from the national dialogue will be ratified, since delegitimised existing 
institutions or unelected interim governments may not be the most legitimate bodies 
to ratify the agreement. Public mechanisms such as referendums or elections may 
therefore be alternative mechanisms used to confirm and legitimise the outcomes of 
the national dialogue.46 However, consensus decision-making procedures may lead 
to deadlocks and difficulties to find a common ground for everybody, resulting in a 
lowest common denominator outcome.47 Second, consensus-building procedures are 
important in order to find an agreement in case of difficulties and deadlocks. 
Examples of deadlock-breaking mechanism are resorting to a ‘passive consensus’ 
(with abstention) or a ‘general consensus’ (on a general text). 
In Yemen, the Consensus Committee was conceptualised as a structure that would 
take charge of the final vetting of issues where it was difficult to find an agreement in 
the working groups. However, a high level of consensus was required during all the 
stages of the process before the decisions, provisions and recommendations reached 
the Committee. The Consensus Committee was made up of the National Dialogue 
Conference presidency, the chairpersons of the nine working groups, the Technical 
Committee and representatives of civil society organisations, youth and women (in 
the same proportions as the national dialogue itself). Once the Consensus Committee 
had dealt with the deadlock, the agreement was sent back to the working group 
where the decisions could be adopted by a 75% majority in a second round. If no 
agreement was found on articles left over at that stage, the final decision was made 
by President Hadi, giving him a power that was not perceived as legitimate by all the 
stakeholders.48 
Operationalisation 
The operationalisation of the national dialogue is related to all the mechanisms set-up 
to carry out the process itself and to guarantee the implementation of its outcomes. 
Another factor includes the technical support structures, the deadlock-breaking 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 1.  
47 Berghof Foundation, op.cit., pp. 102-103.  
48 A. Eshaq & S. Al-Marani, “Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 
Interventions in Yemen”, Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (WOSCAP), 
Sana’a, Political Development Forum - Yemen, 2017, p. 24.  
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mechanisms, the funding and the implementation of the outcomes of the dialogue. 
In Yemen, the operationalisation of the national dialogue was particularly challenging.  
Support structures, deadlock-breaking mechanisms and safety nets should ensure the 
continuation of the national dialogue. While safety nets are mechanisms that support 
the process as a whole, the deadlock-breaking mechanisms consist of more 
comprehensive structures to respond to stalemate situation. The deadlock-breaking 
mechanisms may consist of the involvement of a mediator, facilitator or arbitrator in 
order to overcome situations in which no consensus has been found.  
In Yemen, the Consensus Committee was created to manage contradictory 
outcomes during the NDC. However, the Consensus Committee could not act as an 
efficient deadlock-breaking mechanism as some fundamental issues were ‘resolved’ 
without the support of all stakeholders.49 This was the case for the organisation of 
Yemen into six federal regions. In August 2013, the southern representatives threatened 
to boycott the last meetings of the national dialogue unless a certain political status 
was met. As they had enough participants in the NDC to jeopardise any of its 
outcomes, this was considered as a serious warning.50 Since neither the working groups 
nor the Consensus Committee were able to reach an agreement on the issue, a new 
deadlock-breaking mechanism was set up as the ‘8+8’ or North-South Committee. This 
new Committee of 16 members (8 from the North and 8 from the South) agreed on 
certain issues of the federal organisation: Yemen will become a federal state with 
more local autonomy for the regions. However, this agreement fell apart when no 
consensus was found on the precise repartition of financial, administrative and 
political competences.51 The decisions to end the national dialogue and discuss this 
subject in another body – the Regions Committee composed of 22 members – rushed 
the discussions, since the Regions Committee had only one week to come up with a 
proposal. Chaired by President Hadi, the Regions Committee decided that Yemen 
would be divided into six regions, with two regions in the South and four regions in the 
North. This decision appeared to be more the “reflection of the President’s attempts 
to force a compromise than a genuine elite bargain”52 and was strongly rejected by 
the southern parties; they wanted to return to a two-region federal state as before the 
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unification.53 The Houthis were also against this agreement. They wanted to have their 
own region with access to the Red Sea, including Saada. Protests in the streets of both 
the southern and the northern parts of the country were mounting, renouncing the 
national dialogue and calling for secession. Because of the lack of solutions for these 
crucial issues, the outcomes of the national dialogues attracted few supporters.54  
The implementation of the national dialogue outcomes includes setting up 
infrastructures, guarantees and monitoring mechanisms to further the dialogue 
between the parties and to keep working on the social deadlocks. Internal and 
external actors can rely on such instruments in order to encourage the various 
stakeholders to effectively implement the final agreement.55 During the 
implementation phase, the culture of dialogue and compromise should persist and 
become a recurrent mechanism. 
Yemen’s national dialogue is an example of failed implementation. The Constitutional 
Drafting Commission was supposed to constitutionalise the political agreement 
reached at the end of the Yemeni national dialogue. Nonetheless, in addition to the 
question of the federal organisation of the state, the transitional justice committee was 
not able to submit a final document. While the GCC Initiative gave immunity to 
President Saleh and the members of his party, the GPC, in exchange for their 
resignation, many members of the transitional justice committee wanted to prosecute 
and banish the people responsible of the killing of unarmed protestors in 2011 from the 
right to stand in the elections.56 Finally, the GPC continued to be a major actor on the 
Yemeni political scene, even though it represented one of the main causes of the 
uprising in the first place. The Constitution Drafting Committee was therefore ill-
equipped to deal with the political problems left by the NDC. The increasing armed 
presence of the Houthis in Sana’a led the Constitution Drafting Committee to move to 
Abu Dhabi in late 2014 in order to finish the draft constitution.57 
Social cohesion 
Social cohesion of post-conflict societies going through national dialogues constitutes 
the fourth factor of the ANDES model, and the cornerstone of processes such as long-
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term national dialogues. One of the national dialogue’s main aims is indeed to 
redefine a social contract and the relationship between the government, the political 
elites and the various parts of civil society. In order to reach this objective, working on 
deep social fractures, conflicts and feelings of frustration – often unresolved since 
decades in authoritarian societies – is as crucial as difficult to manage in order to go 
through a national dialogue. Hidden behind the uprisings that characterised the Arab 
Spring, social cohesion concerns are sensitive and irrational issues that make all 
reasoned discussions far harder and more complex.58 Indeed, political fissures of post-
conflict societies “will prevent them from forging new social contracts, reforming state 
institutions, or rebuilding their ruined economies – all core demands of the uprisings in 
the first place”.59 The lack of social cohesion was the main issue of the Yemeni national 
dialogue. Even if the NDC was designed to be highly inclusive and wanted to create 
more social cohesion in the Yemeni society, it ended up increasing the ethnic and 
regional fragmentation.  
Jane Jenson elaborated five useful dimensions of the social cohesion concept: 
belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, and legitimacy.60 Belonging means 
that individuals refer to the existence of shared values, shared history and shared 
identity.61 Because of deep religious and regional fragmentations, the lack of a 
common identity and feeling of belonging to the same society is a crucial element 
explaining the failure of the Yemeni national dialogue. Thus, even if the process-design 
and the decision-making procedures wanted to be highly inclusive, the 
operationalisation of the NDC turned out to be problematic.  
Inclusion refers to the economic inclusion of the actors, meaning that they need to 
have access to the national market and should not be economically isolated from the 
rest of the society. In the context of a national dialogue, the inclusion of economic 
considerations directly impacting the population is crucial for the legitimacy of the 
process and for not addressing only elite issues. As already mentioned above, the 
extended time-frame of the Yemeni NDC frustrated the population, which had the 
feeling that the “national dialogue was to overlook ‘bread and butter’ issues which 
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regular citizens were facing while the dialogue was taking place”.62 Both the 
economic and security situations worsened with an unemployment rate close to 50%. 
Furthermore, the transitional government decided to lift fuel subsidies in July 2014, 
“providing the Houthi coup with a veneer of public support” to take control over the 
capital.63  
Participation raises the question of the political involvement and representation both 
at the local and national levels of the various actors composing a society such as 
political parties, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations, 
independent citizens, national experts, representatives of groups, etc. In a national 
dialogue, a high and diversified participation is crucial to ensure that different groups 
of the society work on their issues and express their concerns, which are not always the 
same as the political elites. A national dialogue representing the various stakeholders 
composing a post-conflict society thus increases the legitimacy of the process and the 
credibility of the final agreement. As explained previously, the political participation 
was highly challenging in Yemen. First, important Southern leaders from al-Hiraak did 
not take part in the NDC, which jeopardised the legitimacy of the NDC’s final 
agreement.64 Second, while the Yemeni NDC was designed in order to have a broad 
participation and to be highly inclusive, the process suffered from inefficiency and a 
lack of technical expertise in some working groups. Third, the Yemeni NDC shifted from 
being largely inclusive, to increasingly exclusive as the final decisions had to be taken. 
The Regional Committee, which had the last word on some fundamental issues, was 
perceived as being a “small, fairly unrepresentative committee”.65 Fourth, even if 
some mechanisms were set up for the delegates to engage with the larger public, 
ensuring the involvement of Yemen’s population outside of Sana’a in the process was 
highly difficult.  
Recognition entails the acceptance of the diversity within a society by all the actors 
and thus in the national dialogues’ participation. The lack of recognition was so deeply 
rooted in some Yemeni societal groups that the failure regarding state organisation 
was highly sensitive. Indeed, neither the southern population nor the Houthis felt that 
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their territorial claims were recognised in the new organisation of a six-region federal 
state, pushed for by President Hadi.66 
Legitimacy refers to the capacity of the state institutions to endorse the role of a 
mediator among its citizens, in order for the outcomes to be accepted by the 
population.67 The legitimacy of the Yemeni national dialogue was put into question by 
two main elements. First, the chair of the national dialogue was President Hadi and his 
transitional government, who was not recognised by all the parties in Yemen and 
perceived as the prolongation of the former regime.68 Second, the NDC was more 
perceived as “an external process driven by the international community rather than 
as a Yemeni national process”.69 Planned as the second phase of the GCC Initiative’s 
Implementation Mechanism, the national dialogue was mentored by the G10, with a 
prominent role for Saudi Arabia, the United States and the United Nations. Moreover, 
the Implementation Mechanism was highly perceived as an ‘elite deal’ negotiated 
between foreign actors and old political elites and not by the leaders of the street 
protests.70  
In conclusion, several elements of the process-design, the decision-making and the 
operationalisation can explain the lack of social cohesion within the Yemeni society 
and between its representatives participating in the NDC. The mismanagement of the 
first three factors can indeed jeopardise the feeling of belonging, inclusiveness, 
participation, recognition and legitimacy of the various stakeholders participating in 
the national dialogue and the Yemeni population, undermining the peace process as 
a whole.  
Nevertheless, evaluating the success or the failure of mediation processes in general 
“poses serious conceptual and methodological problems”.71 According to Bercovitch, 
considering mediation as “unsuccessful where it does not produce a full settlement, 
irrespective of the nature of the conflict, represents a failure to appreciate the full 
complexity of the conflict, the different outcomes that may bring a conflict to an end, 
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and the decision process underlying the entry or exit of a mediator”.72 Hence, the 
Berghof Foundation makes the distinction between two kinds of outcomes: the 
tangible and the intangible ones.73 The tangible outcomes are the expected results of 
a national dialogue, shaped in the original mandate (such as political or constitutional 
change, human rights, social and economic reforms, etc.). By contrast, intangible 
outcomes are unexpected results that can come out of the process such as the 
experience in itself, the increase in dialogue or the transformation of the relationships 
between the actors.74 National dialogues may therefore have a broader function, 
namely developing a fruitful environment for reconciliation and forstering the 
understanding of the “needs, perceptions and perspectives of the ‘other’ and 
progressively developing joint visions between the conflicting parties”.75 In Yemen, the 
inclusion of Houthis and some representatives of Al-Hiraak, for the first time in the 
national history, demonstrated the readiness to set up a more inclusive transition 
process, which is very important in societies that have experienced authoritarianism.76 
This is also key for the long term as it creates a precedent and a basis for future political 
discussions in Yemen.77  
 
What roles for the EU in Yemen’s national dialogue?  
Over the past decade, international mediation has become part of the European 
Union’s comprehensive toolbox for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-
keeping in crises and conflicts. Thanks to its large spectrum of foreign policy instruments 
and its international network, the EU is described as “well placed to mediate, facilitate 
or support mediation and dialogues processes”.78 However, the absence of 
professionalisation and standardisation of the EU mediation activities, the lack of 
coherence both between the member states themselves and with the institutions, the 
divergence in interests and the lack of knowledge and expertise to support peace 
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mediation processes constitute real disadvantages.79 In order to remedy this situation, 
the EU had already produced in 2009 the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation 
and Dialogue Capacities’.80 This key document provides the EU officials “who are, in 
accordance with their mandate, engaging in multiple ways in a conflict region with 
mediation”, with some guidance.81 Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty, through its 
institutional reforms, has enabled new actors such as the High Representative and the 
EU Special Representatives to take on a role of international mediator.82 Finally, the EU 
has developed a Mediation Support Team within the European External Action 
Service’s (EEAS) Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation.83 
Established in 2011, the EEAS Mediation Support Team provides EU officials with 
mediation support and technical expertise, through training and drawing on lessons 
learned.84  
While the 2009 Concept presents various functions that the EU can have in mediation 
processes in general, it may in national dialogues assume additional roles. More 
precisely, the Berghof Foundation’s Handbook has developed six different roles for 
external actors to engage in national dialogues: enabler, funder, observer/guarantor, 
provider of technical and expert support, facilitator, and implementer/monitor/ 
verifier.85 According to the type and function of the national dialogues analysed (long-
term or short-term mechanism), the EU will have a different way to engage in the 
various roles.86 In a large process aiming at fundamental change, it is indeed even 
more important for the EU to find a delicate balance between assuring both liberal 
reforms and the credibility and legitimacy of the process.  
This section focuses therefore on the various entry points of the EU for supporting the 
process-design, the decision-management procedures, the operationalisation and 
the social cohesion of the Yemeni national dialogue, which is considered as a long-
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term process. EU-Yemen relations are mostly framed by the Cooperation Agreement 
signed in 1998, dealing with economic and development policies. In 2004, relations 
developed further when the EU and Yemen took up a ‘political dialogue’.87 The EU 
also opened a Delegation in Sana’a, and in 2006 the EU was invited to support 
Yemen’s elections with an Observer Mission.88 While the UN had undeniably taken the 
role of the leading mediator in the Yemeni transition process, the European Union 
supported the national dialogue in a more informal way.   
Enabler 
Enabler means that the external actor will use its influence and resources to 
encourage the parties to engage in a constructive dialogue. In a power-based 
approach, the EU can use leverage, meaning economic and diplomatic incentives or 
restrictive measures, in order to bring the parties to the table and ensure their effective 
and fair participation.89  
In Yemen, the EU politically promoted the idea of a national dialogue, with both the 
Yemeni parties and the regional actors to be included in the GCC Initiative.90 The EU 
acted as an enabler by threatening President Saleh to freeze his financial assets and 
by participating in the general international pressure for his resignation.91 The EU also 
put pressure on both the GPC and the JMP, the two main political parties, to sign the 
GCC agreement.  
Funder 
The role of funder includes providing financial resources for supporting the process itself 
as well as the implementation of the outcomes, and ensuring the continuity of the 
government functions during the national dialogue. In general, this role is possible 
thanks to the various financial instruments of the EU which contain funds for mediation 
action: the Instrument for Stability, the African Peace Facility, the Policy Advice and 
Mediation Facility, the Peace-building Partnership and the Early Response 
Mechanism.92 
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In Yemen, the EU unblocked a large amount of funds to support the NDC.93 It financed 
the NDC through the UN Yemen National Dialogue and Constitutional Reform Trust 
Fund. Between 2012 and 2014, the EU contributed around 2 million US$, in addition to 
20 million US$ from the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark.94   
Support provider 
The EU can be a provider of technical and/or expert support in the various factors of 
national dialogue thanks to its relevant expertise from past experiences. Indeed, 
“national dialogues are complex processes, and external actors can help in the 
establishment of structures and administrative frameworks, particularly when the 
parties have a limited experience of public services”.95 This can include training and 
trust-building exercises and specific thematic knowledge and analysis, such as the 
promotion of inclusive governance reforms.96  
According to a former EEAS official, providing technical and expertise support was a 
“high added-value of the EU in Yemen, in comparison to the other members of the 
G10. The EU in that regards brings also international legitimacy in the peace process”.97 
The EU offered mediation advice to the members of the political elite − namely Vice-
President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the members of the GCP −, the opposition 
parties, the Technical Committee and to the various working groups it was attending. 
The EU also provided capacity-building support for youth, women and non-traditional 
actors, to help them adopt a common negotiating position.  
Observer/guarantor 
Being an observer and/or a guarantor is the third role that an external actor can play. 
As an observer, the EU is present during the operationalisation of the national dialogue 
and ensures international observance and support just through its presence as a third 
party in the working groups. Being an observer is close to being a guarantor as, by 
combing the two roles, the external actor can “help to create a conducive 
environment for rapprochement and for negotiations based on trust between the 
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sides”.98 As a guarantor, the EU could also assure the security of the negotiation by 
monitoring a ceasefire or security agreement, while supporting confidence-building 
measures. In Yemen, the EU acted as an observer and a guarantor during the NDC in 
itself, and particularly in the working group where it was present. 
Facilitator 
EU actors can also play the role of facilitator by “acting as go-betweens and helping 
to build trust or resolve specific issues in the process”.99 For that function, the EU can 
help the conflicting parties to identify the different claims, interests and needs during 
the process-design of the national dialogue. This can be done by setting up informal 
discussions to explore options in case of deadlock at a higher official level, especially 
when some leverage is needed. Moreover, supporting a transformative type of 
mediation in order to reshape the perception that the conflicting parties have of each 
other is also important to increase the social cohesion of post-conflicting societies. 
External actors like the EU can support various projects with transformative objectives 
on different ‘tracks’ and levels of society by providing funding and political backing.100  
This was particularly the case in Yemen, where the EU particularly adopted the role of 
a facilitator, by providing a fruitful environment for some informal meetings between 
the representatives of the various conflicting parties (Houthis, the South Yemen groups, 
youth and Central Security Organisations) besides the higher-level mediation activities 
of the GCC Initiative.101 As the EU Delegation had been in Sana’a for several years, it 
enjoyed a large network and contacts with the majority of the parties and was 
perceived as being the most neutral and “trustworthy of the G10 members”.102 Thus, 
the EU was in a better position than some other members of the G10 to reach out to 
conflicting parties such as the Houthis and the Southern region in order to bring them 
into the political dialogue.103  
Implementer/monitor/verifier 
The last role is being an implementer, a monitor and a verifier during the 
implementation phase. Thanks to its 140 Delegations around the world, the EU also has 
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the capacity to engage directly with the parties on the ground, and monitor the 
development and operationalisation of the national dialogue.104 Relying on and 
supporting non-state actors by establishing constructive partnerships is central, as they 
are in a better position to implement the outcomes of mediation processes on the 
ground.105 The EU can therefore help the various actors to implement the national 
dialogues’ outcomes, such as the supervision of elections.  
While the EU played various roles in the Yemen’s NDC, several limits of its action can 
be highlighted. First, the EU did not have enough leverage on President Saleh to push 
him to resign. In that regard, the EU’s enabler role was limited to supporting the Gulf 
countries that were more likely to have some clout. Yemen was indeed neither part of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the MEDA programme nor any of the EU 
multilateral arrangements, therefore limiting the leverage of EU economic sanctions 
on Yemen’s government.106 Moreover, the EU’s engagement as a facilitator 
diminished radically during the NDC in itself. This can be explained by two main 
reasons. First, the arrival of the UN Special Adviser Jamal Benomar in 2012 gave to the 
UN a highly proactive role as the main mediator of the NDC. The EU Delegation did 
not make full use of its mediation capabilities in order not to duplicate Benomar’s 
efforts.107  
Second, the EU Head of Delegation changed during the conflict resolution process. 
While the first Head of Delegation focused on both the Houthis and the youth, the 
second focused more on the Houthis, leading to some frustration and disappointment 
within the other group.108 On the other hand, the new Head of Delegation was 
perceived as more ‘approachable’ by the civil societies organisations. The difference 
between the first and second Head of Delegation shows how the EU, through its 
officials on the ground, is limited in its ability to be trusted and politically accepted by 
the parties.109 Moreover, even if the UN was considered as the main mediator, the EU 
could have better followed up the application of the decision-management rules of 
the transition process, by denouncing some failures of the procedures.110 This was 
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particularly the case for Hadi’s failure to implement confidence-building measures 
and install an Interpretation Committee as the GCC Agreement had stipulated.111 
Then, the decision to follow the GCC Initiative “has shaped the course of the EU’s 
relationship with Yemen”.112  
The first agreement between Saleh and the GCC contained indeed Saleh’s immunity 
and the possibility for his party, the GCP, to stay in the political landscape. This Initiative 
was referring only to the opposition party, the JMP, and the GCP, neglecting the other 
political forces such as the Houthis and the Southern parties. As Eshaq and Al-Marani 
claim, “the EU was seen to push a solution that involved the wrong parties and 
excluded many others. This was seen to reflect the desire of regional and international 
actors for a solution, rather than being driven by the sincere concern to address the 
needs of the Yemeni people”.113 This qualifies the perception of the EU’s relative 
neutrality, which was described above as the main added-value of the EU as a 
facilitator in the process. This role is even more constrained today as the EU Delegation 
moved to Amman (Jordan), making it difficult to maintain the relationship with the 
parties.114 Moreover, a number of EU member states declared full support for the Saudi-
led military campaign, including the UK and France. This has weakened the ‘impartial’ 
position of the EU that it had in the eyes of many parties. Constrained by the mandate 
from the member states, the EU Delegation has difficulties operating on the ground 
and to resume the dialogue between the various actors.115  
The following table summarises the roles and the limits of the EU’s involvement in the 
Yemeni case.  
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Conclusion and lessons learned 
Analysing a national dialogue is highly complex as such a process has to be studied in 
“the broader national history where it takes place”.116 This paper presents a new model 
to analyse national dialogues in various contexts. Applied to the Yemeni National 
Dialogue Conference, the ANDES model offers some keys to understand why a 
national dialogue such as the Yemen’s NDC failed, while the process was at the 
beginning highly promising. Concerning the Yemeni case, this paper finds that working 
on the process-design, the decision-making procedure and the operationalisation of 
a national dialogue is crucial in order to increase the social cohesion of post-conflict 
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General lack of leverage to ensure per se the NDC and 
the respect of NDC rules by the conflicting parties  
The EU had less leverage in the G10 discussions 
regarding the planning of the transition process and the 
immunity of Saleh’s government  
Funder 
 
General EU funding through the UN Yemen National Dialogue and 
Constitutional Reform Trust Fund 
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guarantor 
 
EU presence 
during the 
process-design  
Lack of EU 
presence in the 
follow up of 
compliance 
with procedural 
rules  
EU presence in 
the working 
groups of the 
NDC, in particular 
on the Saada 
issue  
 
Provider of 
technical 
and/or expert 
support 
Expertise 
support to the 
Technical 
Committee 
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societies participating in this process. The mismanagement of the first three factors 
indeed jeopardised the feeling of belonging, inclusiveness, participation, recognition 
and legitimacy of the various stakeholders participating in NDC and the larger Yemeni 
population, deepening the historical fragmentations. The ANDES model highlights 
therefore how crucial it is to find for each of these factors the right equilibrium between 
efficiency and inclusiveness, short-term deadlock breaking mechanisms and long-
term transformational aims as well as consensus-building and goals. Nevertheless, this 
dialogue was necessary to initiate a shift in the governance and the citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making process on national issues.117 In this regard, the 
NDC did contribute to producing a draft constitution that can serve as a basis to work 
on when the political climate will be stable enough to restart the negotiations.118  
The paper’s second objective was to analyse how the EU can support national 
dialogues abroad without undermining the national ownership of such processes. The 
involvement in a national dialogue requires various tools and roles in order to provide 
a sustainable and comprehensive support. The EU can indeed get involved in national 
dialogues thanks to funding and dialogue facilitation activities, leverage to ensure the 
participation of all the stakeholders, the provision of technical support and as an 
observer and guarantor. However, “it is these multiple dimensions of a potential EU role 
which makes the approach to mediation more complex as […] the EU is never 
engaged only in mediation but also in development cooperation, diplomacy and 
trade relations”.119 While the EU can play various roles, those may come into conflict 
with the needs of the actors and the respect for national ownership.120 Ensuring the 
inclusiveness, fairness and efficiency in the process-design, the decision-making 
management and the operationalisation of national dialogues without undermining 
the national ownership underlying such processes is therefore crucial.121  However, this 
balance has to be found in different ways for each national dialogue, as “it depends 
largely on the conflict dynamic, the situation and the perception of the EU in the field, 
and its relations with the actors”.122 It is through lessons learned from various cases that 
                                                 
117 Ibid.  
118 Gluck, op.cit., p. 55.  
119 N.C. Brandenburg, “EU Mediation as an Assemblage of Practices: Introducing a New 
Approach to the Study of EU Conflict Resolution”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 55, 
no. 5, 2017, p. 995.  
120 S. Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy”, International Studies Review, vol. 4, no. 5, 2003, 
pp. 91-95.  
121 C. Collen, National Dialogues and Internal Mediation Processes: Perspectives on Theory and 
Practice, Helsinki, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014, p. 40.  
122 Interview with a former EEAS official, Bruges, 16 April 2018.  
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the EU will increasingly be able to engage in national dialogues in a “comprehensive, 
systemic and multilevel way”.123  
From the application of the ANDES model to the Yemeni NDC, five main lessons 
learned can already be suggested. First, having a strong relationship with the country 
involved in a national dialogue, as well as a considerable influence in the region 
surrounding the country concerned, helps to pressure the conflicting parties into 
participating in national dialogues in a fair and sustainable way (enabler role). By 
increasing its weight in the discussions, the EU can better promote its considerations 
regarding various topics such as liberal reforms, transitional justice and the design and 
operationalisation of the process at large in order to ensure its fairness, inclusiveness 
and legitimacy. The low degree of the EU’s influence in Yemen had, for example, 
direct consequences for its weight in the discussions of the GCC Initiative regarding 
President Saleh’s immunity. Moreover, the EU could have exercised more pressure on 
Hadi’s government to ensure that confidence-building measures and decision-making 
procedures were respected until the end of the process.  
Second, it is important to deepen the connections and links with civil society 
organisations, opposition parties, NGOs and various ethnicities composing the post-
conflicting society. It is this large network on the ground that has enabled the EU to 
play a facilitating role and bring various actors to the tables of the Yemen NDC. This 
role was clearly the biggest added-value of the EU in the Yemeni case.  
Third, the EU must continue its funding activities to support national dialogues, which 
are highly expensive in the long-term. Providing financial support is crucial to help the 
national authorities ensure the provision of basic services to the population, such as 
water, electricity, healthcare, food, etc. If the basic needs are put aside to focus on 
the national dialogue only, this can lead to a loss of legitimacy of the process, and 
sometimes restart uprisings, as was the case in Yemen.   
Fourth, providing technical support and expertise is also important, as some 
participants may not have sufficient training and know-how to be on an equal footing 
with other conflict parties that are used to the political scene. This can help reduce 
the power asymmetries between the participants, and reinforce the inclusiveness and 
fairness of the process. 
                                                 
123 Interview with an EU diplomat, via telephone, 20 April 2018. 
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Fifth, the EU should increase its collaboration and coherence with both its member 
states and the other external actors involved in national dialogues. As the United 
Nations were increasingly perceived as favourable to Hadi’s government by the 
southern and northern parties, the collaboration between the EU and the UN was even 
more important, in order to keep all the actors at the negotiation table. Furthermore, 
the EU crucially needs to improve coherence with its member states. The support, in 
2015, for Saudi Arabia’s military coalition by some member states deeply harmed the 
EU’s credibility as a mediator on the ground and its ability to interact with all the 
conflicting parties. 
These ‘lessons learned’ constitute general considerations for any future EU involvement 
in national dialogues. However, as the present paper covers only one case study, it 
would be highly interesting to conduct the same analysis for a series of national 
dialogues where the EU was involved. The ANDES model described above provides 
key entry points for the EU’s support to national dialogues according to the specificities 
of each process (process-design, decision-management procedures, operational-
isation and social cohesion). While this model does not pretend to be exhaustive, as 
additional roles and/or factors characterising national dialogues may be added in 
future analysis, it offers an analytical tool that can be used both at the academic and 
practitioner levels.  
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